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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
I. J WAGNER and ILENE J. WAGNER, 
hushand and wife, and 
WALLACE A. WRIGHT, JR., and 
JERALYN T. WRIGHT, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
12618 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMUNT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiffs and Appellants for 
declaratory judgment that a State statute, the Utah Underground 
Conversion of Utilities Law, and an ordinance of Salt Lake 
City enacted pu:suant to such statute, are each invalid and un-
constitutional and for an injunction against the Defendant from 
undertaking any further proceedings in connection with 
Underground Conversion of Utilities District Number 8-F-lA. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment based 
upon the proceedings on file and a stipulation of facts entered 
into between the parties. After argument, the District Court 
determined that there was no dispute as to any material faces 
that the statute and ordinance were constitutional and tha; 
the injunction requested should be denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks the sustaining of the Dis. 
trict Court judgment and a holding that the statute and ordi· 
nance involved are constitutional and that the injunction 
prayed for should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent accept the statement of facts as 
contained in the Plaintiff-Appellants' Brief. 
The Utah Underground Conversion of Utilities Law en· 
acted in the 1969 regular session of the Utah Legislature in , 
Chapter 157, Laws of Utah, 1969, and compiled in the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as Sections 54-8-1 through 54-8-30, 
will be referred to in the Brief as "State Statute". 
The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City by ordi· : 
nance passed October 27, 1970, which became effective on 
d' e its publication on November 18, 1970, adopted an or 1~~nc 
which substantially re-enacts for Salt Lake City the prov15tonl 
d . · f d Chapter 7 ol of the State Statute. Such or mance is oun as 
2 
Title 39 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
1953. This ordinance is sometimes referred to in this Brief 
as "the Ordinance". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE ARE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND IBEY DO NOT 
AUTHORIZE PUBLIC ACTION FOR A PRI-
VATE PURPOSE, NOR LEND IBE CREDIT OF 
A MUNICIPALITY FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE 
NOR DELEGATE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS TO 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. 
The safeguards of the Act which are hereafter recited, 
provide more than adequate protection to the property owners 
in the improvement district. More hearings, more opportuni-
ties to object and eventually an opportunity to test the matter 
in the courts are given each property owner included in the 
district. 
State Statutes §54-8-6; Ordinance §39-7-6, clearly indi-
cate that only by and under the initiative of the property owners 
can two-thirds of those property owners commence the im-
provement district. Certainly then, the negative is true. If 
over one-third of the property owners or those who owned over 
one-third of the value of the property in the improvement dis-
trict objected to the improvement district, at any stage, the 
local governing body must abandon the district no matter who 
instigated it. State Statute §54-8-4 and Ordinance §39-7-4 
simply are but a preamble to the law indicating what the 
Underground Conversion of Utilities Law is about. 
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A. The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not A th u or. 
ize Public Action and Taxation For a Private Pur. 
pose. 
In Wicks v. Salt Lake City, et al, 60 Utah 265, 208 P.538 
( 1922) the plaintiff sought to prohibit Salt Lake City from 
issuing certain special improvement bonds for a street lighting 
district. That district was on State Street between South Tern. 
ple and Fourth South. This Court concluded in that street 
lighting case the following: 
"In the light of these decisions and the various 
statutes referred to there can be no doubt as to the 
power of the City to light the streets of the City, or any 
section thereof, by draft upon the general funds. If 
the City elects, however, to organize a district as in the 
instant case, and levy a special tax on abutting prop· 
erty to pay the taxes, and issue bonds therefor, it is 
equally free from doubt that the City has the power to 
establish a special improvement guarantee fund to 
secure the payment of the bonds as provided in the 
Act of 1921." (page 540) 
B. The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not Author· 
ize a Lending of Public Credit for Private Pur· 
poses Contrary to the Utah Constitution. 
A significant question is whether there is, under this Act, 
a lending of public credit for a private purpose. The Supreme 
Court of Utah looked at a similar question in 1960, in the 
matter of State Road Commission of Utah v. Utah Power and 
Light Company, 10 U.2d 333, 353 P.2d 171. In that case the 
Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that the legislature had 
1 1. h utilities of the power to change the common aw to re 1eve t e 
· f -r· andto the obligation to pay the costs of relocating ao 1nes 
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impose the cost on the State, for highway relocation. This 
became an issue by the advent of Federal highway programs 
which forced the relocation of utilities because of the realign-
ment of the highways. The question arose as to who should 
ultimately pay for the relocation costs occasioned by the new 
highways. The courts found that relocations could be ordered 
by the police power of the State for the benefit of all the peo-
ple. In StC1te Road Commission of Utah v. Utah Power and 
Light Comp"ny, 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171, the Court 
opined: 
The legislature has determined the policy to be 
pursued in the relocation of utility facilities; and, mind-
ful of the magnitude of the newly inaugurated federal 
program and the equitities to be adjusted as fixed in 
advance the terms upon which relocation shall be re-
quired. There is no gain to the utilities. They are sim-
ply protected from suffering a net loss in the relocation 
of their facilities all resulting from this vast and far-
flung highway building program. 
In the highway relocation case, the public purpose is the 
need of new highways; correspondingly, the need to move the 
utilities. In the instant case, the need is safety and aesthetics; 
both, the legislature has determined, are the public policy of 
this State In each instance the utility ends up owning the im-
provements, and in both cases, the measure called for money 
coming directly to the utility from the State. In the Utah Power 
and Light case, supra, payment is made directly from the State 
from gasoline tax revenues, to the utility; and in the case at 
hand, payment is made through a special improvement district, 
funded by bonds, which bonds are paid for out of assessments 
from the property owners immediately adjacent to the im-
provements. 
; 
The Court in the Utah Power and Light case sup f ' ra, ur. 
ther stated: 
The numerical weight of authority holds th 
under constitutional limitations similar to those in u ~ 
the legislature has the power to change the comm ta 
law to relieve ~e util_i~i~ of the obligation to pay ~~ 
cost of relocating faoliues and to impose the cost 
the State. (Citations) on 
The Court apparently relied heavily upon Justice Car. 
dozo's opinion in Oswego and Syracuse R. Co. v. State, 226 
N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8 and quoted extensively from that opin-
ion. 
There are analogies between the relocation and burying 
of overhead utilities because of highway construction versus 
the public desire for beautification and safety which is involved 
in this act. In both cases, the utilities owned the facilities prior 
and in both cases the utilities owned the facilities at the end 
of the improvement. In the case of the highways, the funds to 
relocate the utilities came from the gasoline tax imposed on 
all of the citizens alike whether or not they favored relocation 
of the utilities or the burying of the utilities. In this act, pay· 
ment is made by those who live in the improvement district 
and who most directly benefit from the improvement. That is 
not to say that in both cases those who may not pay a gasoline 
taX and those who may not live in the improvement district 
don't benefit from the improvements. They do. In both in· 
stances the unsightliness of the utilities are gone. 
It may be argued that the utilities are getting a new c~r 
at no cost to them, when they only had an old car before 
10 
the form of the old utility system. By way of analogy, we urge 
. h · · the utilities are this Court to recogmze t at 1t 1s not a new car 
6 
getting but a new fender on an old car inasmuch as this district 
represents bur a small portion of the utility systems' entire grid 
throughout the city and county and the State. To further the 
analogy '" e suggest that a new fender on an old car does not 
make for a new car. 
In Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U.2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 
( 1968) the Court upheld a Tooele County plan, pursuant to 
legislztive act, to issue bonds to finance the construction of in-
dustrial facilities. Upon their completion, the facilities were to 
be leased to private corporations. The bonds were to be issued 
under the name of the county, but were to be repaid by rentals 
from the constructed facilities. This public purpose directly 
benefited private corporations. The court said in upholding 
the legislation: 
The final point we comment on is the plaintiff's 
charge that the Act must be held invalid because of the 
lack of a substantial public purpose. This question has 
been determined at three levels preceding the pre-
rogative of this court to make such a determination. 
The first is the legislature; the second is the county 
commission; and the third is the trial court. All of them 
appear to have regarded industrial development as a 
proper public purpose. In deference to those prior 
prerogations, this court would not upset such determi-
nation, except upon a persuasive showing that it was so 
clearly an error as to be capricious and arbitrary, a 
circumstance we do not find present here." See Car-
michael v. Southern Coal and Coke Company, 301 
U.S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937) and 
also Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U. 237, 48 P.2d 530. 
In the present case, both the State Legislature and the 
City Commission have determined that it is a desirable public 
purpose to remove overhead utilities. The question remains 
7 
as to whether there has been a lending of public cre<lit. In 
Allen v. Tooele County, mpra, this court said in commenting 
on the bonds issued by Tooele County: 
It is t? be stated o~ the face of the bonds that in 
no event will they constitute an indebtedness to Tooele 
County or a charge against the $en~r~l credit or taxing 
powers of the County, all of which is m accord with the 
provisions of the Act. Inasmuch as the bonds are pay· 
able only out of the income to be derived from the 
leasing of the plant, and no resort can be had against 
the County or its taxpayers, it is our opinion that the 
project is not a "lending of credit of the County as 
was intended to be prohibited by Sec. 31 of Article 
VI of the Utah Constitution. 
In another case, Utah State Land Board v. Utah State 
Finance Commission, 12 U.2d 265, 365 P.2d 213 ( 1961), 
this Court, in a case involving the State Land Board who want· 
ed to purchase securities for investment purposes, ruled that 
it was constitutional for them to do so. In so ruling, this court 
quoted the case of Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 91 S.E. 2d 
660: 
Use of the State's funds for purchase of securicies 
for the State's benefit is not an extension of "credit" 
which poses any threat to the financial security or wel· 
fare of the State. Extending its credit to aid and pro· 
mote private enterprise was the evil from _which the 
State had suffered financially. The potential danger 
incurred in lending credit to f ?ster and proi:io:e ~: 
interests of those who had no nghtful claim, in JUSttcil 
or in morals, to the State's help or relief was ~e ~v 
to be arrested. When the underlying and a~vanng 
purpose of the transaction and the financial obhgat!O: 
incurred are for the State's benefit, there is no lend· 
ing of its credit though it may have expended its~ '. 
or incurred an obligation that benefits another. ere 
8 
ly because the State incurs an indebtedness or expends 
its funds for its benefit and others may incidentally 
profit thereby does not bring the transaction within 
the letter or the spirit of the 'credit clause' prohibition. 
Our contention is that the utility companies are nothing more 
than incidental beneficiaries. 
This court has deferred to a legislative determination of 
what is a public purpose. The interest in securing water, treat-
ing sewage or promoting industry and relocating utility lines 
have all been declared as needed public purposes. It is urged 
that the legislative determination that the safety and aesthetics 
of the burying of overhead utilities is a public purpose and 1s 
certainly not "arbitrary or without rational basis". 
Fisher, et al vs. City of Astoria, 269 P.853, 128 Oregon 
268, 60 ALR 260 was a similar case of special district for street 
lighting involving a change from old wood pole lights to more 
attractive metal pole lights, the Court said: 
The City contends that placing a lighting system 
in a district of municipality constitutes a local im-
provement, and that the property in the district may 
properly be assessed to pay for the benefit thus con-
ferred; the plaintiffs take the opposite position based 
upon the information contained in the Complaint, we 
assume that the proposed lighting system eliminates 
the cedar poles generally employed in Oregon cities 
for the purpose of holding in suspense arc lights and in 
lieu of the method substitutes metal posts of an attrac-
tive appearance and lamps of great brilliance. Since 
the resolution specifies an up-to-date system, we as-
sume that the wires which will convey the electric cur-
rent to the lamps will be underground. It is common 
know ledge that many businessmen and property own-
9 
ers believe that such a lighting system renders h . h t e 
h
streets more attractive to t e retail trade and thus en. 
ance values. Before the expense of installing an im. 
p~ov~me_nt. can be . assessed against the property in a 
district, 1t 1s essential that improvement should conf 
a substantial benefit upon the property within t~r 
district. It may incident~lly benefit the entire City~ 
that wholesome effect will not destroy its use as the 
foundation for a l?Ca! assessmen:, provided it brings 
to the proposed district a benefit substantially more 
intense than it yields to the rest of the municipality. 
This case like our present case involves a public street to be 
used by the public and those immediately in the district. The 
fact that one is for more attractive lighting and the other is to 
simply do away with less attractive poles does not alter the 
public purpose involved. 
The assertions made by the Appellant's brief on page 14 
thereof is without merit. That is, that there can be no im· 
provement district without the consent of the property owners 
within the district. State Statute §54-8-6; Ordinance §39·7·6, 
indicates as follows: 
Any governing body may, upon a petition signed 
by two-thirds of the owners of the real property and 
the owners of not less than two-thirds in value of the 
real property, as shown by the last assessme~t poles of 
any proposed district requesting the creauon of an 
improvement district as provided in this chapt~r, p-as.5 
a resolution that any regular or special meenng de· 
daring that it finds the improvement district prop:>Sed 
as in the public interest. 
State Statute §54-8-4; Ordinance §39-7-4, does empower the 
· 1 · ent district 
local governing body to create a speoa improvem . 
but only subject to the conditions of State Statute §54-8·
6
, 
10 
Ordinance § 3 9-7-6. This is in harmony with 10-16-7 ( 3), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, wherein the Municipal Improve-
ment District Act makes the same provisions that two-thirds of 
the property owners must file objections. Furthermore, this 
is not a legitimate issue in this matter inasmuch as there was 
a petition by over two-thirds of the property owners in favor 
of the local improvements district. 
Just as in the case of the Municipal Improvement Dis-
trict Act, there can in fact be created an improvement district 
over the objections of those who may not wish it and be re-
quired to pay for it. It makes no difference that one-third or 
less of the property owners in the district may not agree with 
the environmental objectives and public policies set by the 
State and by local governing body. Those same persons may 
not agree with the public policy of having streets or street 
lighting or curbs and gutters but may in a like manner be 
swept into the 20th century against their will if they are out 
voted in the project. 
The Appellant's brief has raised the concern that the 
Public Utility hire their own contractors and supervise their 
own work. It would appear that this court could take judicial 
notice of the complexities of high powered electrical and tele-
phone wires in and around homes and the need for the ex-
pertise and skill that the Utilities would have in seeing that 
the work was properly done. The implication of the Appel-
lant's argument is that the taxpayer would suffer because there 
wasn't customary open competitive bidding through the local 
governing body with the City Engineer inspecting. By the same 
token, the Utility doesn't prosper under this system. They have 
nothing to gain. They had a satisfactory system above the 
11 
ground and all they want to see is that there is going to be a 
satisfactory system beneath the ground. Their objective is to 
have a trouble free system that will provide regular and con-
tinuous service. They submit their estimates to the local gov-
erning body based upon their judgment as to how much the 
work will cost without profit to themselves. 
Appellant indicates that a utility is required to provide 
service to those who request it. The implication is that they 
are required to provide overhead service to those that request 
it. However, the Underground Conversion of Utilities Act has 
indicated that it now is the policy of this State to bury the over-
head utilities whenever possible. The Underground Con· 
version of Overhead Utilities and this lawsuit deal with older 
residential areas where the public utilities have already been 
installed. 
It is not true that a resident can pay cash to the utility 
and obtain underground utilities in an older neighborhood. 
What affects one resident with regard to the burying of over· 
head utilities, affects his neighbor. Thus, in order to accom· 
plish this public purpose and certainly to make it economically 
feasible, the wires over several homes must be buried at the 
same time. Further, the benefit does not flow to the property 
owner alone and certainly not to the public utility. The public 
utility is more than content to leave the lines above ground. 
The public purpose is to bury the overhead utilities whenever 
possible for the safety and esthetics of everyone. This law 
is simply a vehicle to allow those who are willing to pay, 
through an improvement district, the opportunity to accom· 
plish that purpose. 
12 
C. The State Statute and Ordinance Do Not Delegate 
Municipal Functions to Private Corporations. 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d 412, 375 P.2d 
7 5 6 ( 196 2 ) sets forth the conditions which are necessary to 
violate Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution. They 
are: 
" ( 1) Delegation to a private commission or 
power to ( 2) interfere with municipal property, or 
( 3) to perform a municipal function." 
Clearly the special improvement district to bury over-
head public utilities does not violate any one of the three con-
ditions herein mentioned. There is no private commission. 
The governing board of the municipality operates as the com-
mission. There is no interference with municipal property 
other than a right-of-way which is granted whether the utility 
lines are above or below the ground. It does not perform a 
municipal function heretofore performed. It would be diffi-
cult to reason that the municipality should undertake to bury 
the overhead utilities or, indeed, to erect them. A long time 
ago that power was turned over to the utility companies under 
the supervision of the Public Service Commission of the State. 
There is no delegation of power to a "special commis-
sion" referred to in Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 
P.2d 530 ( 1935) in the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe. 
The power is clearly vested in the municipal governing body. 
It might be said that this is a quasi-improvement district, in-
asmuch as there is no governing body other than the City Com-
mission and inasmuch as its delegated responsibility, by 
statute, is to cause the work to be performed, then the function 
is completed. 
13 
Argument is made by the Appellants that thi"s 1 · 1 . eg1s a. 
tlve plan contemplates delegating powers to private interests 
The private interests referred to are the petitioners' 0 . , r prop-
erty o~~ers aff~cted, and the power referred to is the right 
to petition. This goes beyond the Municipal Improvement 
District Act, §10-16-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, wherein 
it states that the municipality itself may initiate the projea. 
However, as a practical matter, in most of the improvements 
(namely, curb and gutter and sidewalk) the municipalities 
await the petition of the residents of an area rather than initiat· 
ing the proposal themselves. The Act in question simply codi-
fies that which has been done in the past and is being done 
under present law. 
The Appellants question the fact that the utilities were 
charged with the responsibility of determining the feasibility 
and not the governing body or the municipality. It might be 
redundant to suggest that the average municipality is not 
equipped technically to review or assess the requirements of 
public utilities, as far as feasibility of installation is concerned. 
Beyond that, the feasibility studies provided by the utilities 
are born of their own expense, for which they are not com· 
pensated. Certainly, there is nothing in Article VI, Section 29, 
of the Utah Constitution requiring the governing body to in· 
itiate the proposal nor to make a determination of feasibility 
nor to provide continued supervision of the project. As men· 
tioned before, the need for providing supervision of under· 
ground utilities is no greater than the need to provide ~uper· 
vision for overhead utilities, which this municipality is not 
competent to do and, by statute, has no authority to do. 
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Clearly there is no offense to Article VI, Section 29, of 
the Utah Constitution in this Act. All the power there is to 
have is given to the municipality, which Article VI, Section 29, 
seeks to protect. Simply stated, the municipality has power 
given to them that they did not have before, and no power 
taken from them which they did have before. 
POINT II 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCES DO 
NOT VIOLA TE THE DEBT LIMIT AND ELEC-
TION PROVISIONS OF THE UT AH CONSTITU-
TION. 
The language of the State Statute §54-8-22; Ordinance 
§39-7-24 is perfectly clear. It provides that bonds "shall be 
secured by and payable from the irrevocable pledge in dedi-
cation to the funds derived from the levy and collection of 
the special assessments in anticipation of the collection of which 
are issued." The language is unmistakable. The funds to pay 
these obligations are to be taken from the levy and special 
assessments and not from any other source. 
A common rule of statutory construction m Norville v. 
State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, 126 ALR 
1318, where Justice Wolfe made the following observations: 
"Statutes duly enacted by the lagislature are presumed to be 
constitutional and valid (citations) . When there is ambiguity 
in the terms of the statute or when it is susceptible of two 
interpretations, one of which would render it unconstitutional 
and the other bring it within constitutional sanctions, the Court 
is bound to choose the interpretation which will uphold the 
statute, and to pronounce a statute unconstitutional only when 
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the c'.15e is so clear as to be free from doubt." (citations) Fur-
ther m their opinion, the Court said "moreover 1·n se k. . . ' e mg to 
give _effect to t~e mtent of ~e legislature, the Court will adopt 
the mterpretat1on of a taxrng statute which lowers th e tax 
burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree with re. 
lation to the tax adopted (citations), and will avoid an in-
terpretation which would lead to an unpractical, unfair or un-
reasonable result." 
The Appellant's interpretation is distinguishable from the 
plain language of the statute, that is to tax only those who live 
within the district. There is likely only two interpretations 
available to the Court. By accepting the Appellant's interpre-
tation, it would render the statute unconstitutional. Whereby, 
accepting the literal meaning of the words, would render the 
statute constitutional. Further, the interpretation of the Ap-
pellants would lead to an impractical, unfair and unreasonable 
result. That is, taxing everyone for the benefits which have 
been sought by a few. 
Under a well settled rule of statutory construction of 
Statutes in pari materia, statutes are not to be considered as 
isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a 
great, connected, homogenous system, or as a single and com· 
plete statutory arrangement. Indeed, as a general rule, where 
legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a sys· 
tern of related general provisions indicative of a settle palicy, 
b. d to new enactments of a fragmentary action on the su iect an 
be carried into effect conformally to it, and they should be 50 
construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the 
· · ll · rts and uJJJ· system and make the skeem consistent m a its pa , 
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form m its operation, unless a different purpose is shown, 
50 Am. Jur. 349, Statutes. See also Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission, supra. 
There is no clear and precise language in the State Statute 
§54-8-22; Ordinance §39-7-24 on this subject that materially 
differ from Sections 10-16-27 and 10-16-29, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended. 
In Engelking v. Investment Board, 458 P.2d 213, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that the Idaho Endowment In-
vestment Board could invest in stocks and bonds. The Idaho 
court said: 
The use of the "credit" as used in the provision 
implies the imposition of some new financial liability 
upon the State which in effect results in the creation 
of a State debt for the benefit of private enterprise. 
This was the evil intended to be remedied by the Idaho 
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 2, and similar provisions 
in other State Constitutions. Yet that particular evil 
is not presented by the investment of existing State 
funds of the State for no new State debt is created by 
such action. 
In the case of Schureman v. State Highway Commission, 
377 Mich. 609, 141 N.W. 2d 62 (1966), the Supreme Court 
of Michigan argued that revenue bonds and special obligation 
bonds share an essential distinction from general obligation 
bonds. The credit of the State is pledged for the payment of 
general obligation bonds. It is not for revenue bonds and 
special obligation bonds. Special obligation bonds are retired 
from special tax revenues earmarked for that purpose. 
17 
The language of State Statutes §54-8-22, Utah Code An. 
notated, and Ordinance §39-7-24 is helpful in dete · · 
. ' m~~ 
the nature of the bonds issued under this Act. It says: 
The bonds shall be dated no earlier than the dat 
?n which the special assessment shall begin to bea~ 
~merest, and shall be secured by and payable from the 
irrevocable pledge and dedication of the funds de-
rived from ~he le~- an~ the collection of the special 
assessments m ant1C1pat1on of the collection of which 
they are issued. 
These are special obligation bonds retired by special tax rev-
enues and would become a lien upon the adjacent property il 
not paid. 
POINT III 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE 
PROVIDE AMPLE DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The issue raised under Point III, "hearings which are 
merely an empty formality and where no real determinations 
of the merit of objections are considered, does not constitute 
due process of law." Probably this statute, more than any 
other of its kind, provides ample due process. A review of that 
due process might be helpful to the Court. 
State Statute §54-8-6; Ordinance §39-7-6 requires that 
two-thirds of the owners of the property in the district must 
petition the City for the creation of an improvement district. 
1 
In those same sections, the City Commission is required to (a) 
seek a response from the public utilities within 120 days, of the 
cost of converting the overhead utilities; ( b) provide a list of 
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the name and address of each property owner in the district, 
and ( c) determine the square footage of each property within 
the district. 
In State Statute §54-8-7; Ordinance §39-7-7, the utilities 
at their expense prepare a feasibility study indicating firstly 
if the project is possible or feasible and secondly, how much 
it would cost to convert from overhead to underground. It is 
well to note here that the utilities are the only entity with the 
available expertise and understanding of power and telephonic 
transmissions to either determine feasibility and cost involved 
in the conversion. It is not reasonable in dealing with potenti-
ally dangerous instrumentalities such as power lines, that City 
or County personnel attempt to make determinations about or 
install or repair such specialized equipment. 
Statutes §54-8-8; Ordinance §39-7-8 requires that after 
the City has received the reports and estimates from the util-
ities that they consider whether or not to create a local im-
provement district. If the reports are favorable and all systems 
are go, they pass a resolution declaring their intention to 
create such a district, including in the resolution the cost and 
expenses to be levied, the need to promote the public welfare 
through this conversion and also include the areas and bound-
aries and their intention to hold a public hearing. 
State Statute §54-8-9; Ordinance §39-7-9 require that 
after the passage of the resolution the governing body shall 
cause notice of the public hearing on the proposed improve-
ment to ( a) be published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the district; ( b) a copy of such notice shall be mailed 
by certified mail to the last known address of each owner of 
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land within the proposed district; ( c) that in addition 
. . , a copy 
of said notice shall be addressed "Owner" and shall be mailed 
to the street number of each piece of improved property to be 
effected by the assessment in the district. 
That Notice that is sent out and published not only de-
scribe the boundary but describes how the project will be 
carried out with an estimate of the costs and indicates that it 
is intended to assess the abutting property owners. In addition 
' it indicates the time and place for the proposed hearing and 
indicates that all interested persons would be heard on the 
matter. 
State Statute §54-8-11; Ordinance §39-7-18 describe the 
nature of the hearing which is mainly to hear all objections, 
to allow the utility company to propose any changes or to 
allow city residents or the utility company to propose any 
changes in the feasibility report. 
The proposed assessment list is prepared after the hearing 
and in State Statute § 5 4-8-16; Ordinance § 3 9-7-17 another 
notice is mailed by certified letter and by regular mail as well 
as published in a paper of general circulation indicating the 
specific assessments on each person's property involved in the 
improvement district. Thereafter, a public hearing is held again 
on the assessment resolutions as well as a Board of Equaliza. 
tion consisting of three members of the Commission to make 
any corrections in the assessment. 
In Elkins, et al v. Millard County Drainage District No. 
3, et al, 294 P. 307, 77 Utah 270, this Court looked at the 
formation of a drainage district. The following procedure was 
followed: 
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1. Petition by a majority of the land owners. 
2. A hearing set 
3. Notice of hearing 
4. The Board could exclude land from the District. 
5. The Board determined the benefits were in ex-
cess of the cost. 
6. The Board created the District. 
7. The Board of Equalization said they appeal to the 
Court. 
In 1930 this Court held that in such procedure there was 
due process. 
POINT IV 
THE METI-IOD OF ASSESSMENT IS 
CONSTIWTIONAL 
The Respondent does not argue with the proposmon 
stated in the Appellant's brief that the "assessment should not 
exceed the special benefit to the property." However, this 
principle of law does not apply in this matter to an assessment 
by square footage of the property. 
Sidewalks, as an example, usually go along the front-
age of a property. The same is true of curb and gutter. Not 
so with overhead utilities. Overhead utilities can attach a 
man's yard from almost any direction. Go across the back line, 
cut diagonally across it or go along the side yard. There are 
certainly no limitations as to how such an overhead utility 
might traverse a lot. 
Further, the benefit of burying the overhead utility for 
the assessed property owner is not the amount of electricity 
flowing through the wires to the home, but the sight and 
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safety of the wires. That concept, heretofore stated is to clean 
up the neighborhood and the community and make ·t 1 more 
attractive and pleasing to the eye. This can be accomplished in 
part by burying of the overhead utilities. Those whose years 
exceed the writer of this brief probably can remember the 
downtown streets of Salt Lake when they were cluttered with 
overhead utilities. Their removal has blessed everyone, and 
make for a more attractive community. Not just the adjacent 
property owners benefit and certainly not benefit the adjacent 
property owners according to the amount of electrical current 
they utilize. 
A fair and equitable way to assess the removal of over· 
head utilities is on a square footage basis per lot. This is par· 
ticularly so for one who owns a lot on the corner. Front foot· 
age to him is onerous. Certainly, under this formula there is 
no gain to anyone, least of all the Utilities. The Legislature 
simply attempted to find an equitable way to assess those in 
the improvement district. The Legislature had no concept as 
to how each individual lot would be shaped or how the over· 
head utilities would cross the lot. Indeed it more fully fills 
the requirement of Gast Realty Company v. Snyder Granite 
Company, 240 U.S. 55, 33 S.Ct. 254, 60 L.Ed. 523, wherein 
the United States Supreme Court stated that "substantial jus· 
tice generally will be done," and that the parties should not 
be taxed "disproportionately to each other and to the benef'.t 
conferred." From many standpoints this is probably more fall 
and equitable than any previously used method for such im· 
provements. 
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In 1916 the Supreme Court of Utah held that property 
assessed on an acreage basis in a drainage District was consti-
tutional. That case was Ferry v. Corrinne Drainage District of 
Box Elder County, 156 Pac. 921, 48 Utah 1. 
The Appellants have dabbled in much speculation in the 
second point they raise in their second argument under this 
subsection, stating that the public utilities benefit from the 
underground utilities and, therefore, should pay a proportionate 
cost of their installation. It is pure speculation to assume that 
it is easier to repair the wire under the ground than it is up 
on top of a pole. It is speculation to assume that a transformer, 
several feet under the ground, is easier to get to in order to 
adjust, repair or replace than one three or four feet above the 
ground. The difference between climbing a pole or digging a 
trench certainly cannot affect the constitutionality of this law. 
The public utilities made an investment when they first 
installed the overhead utilities. It is less expensive and consid-
erably easier for the public utilities to maintain overhead 
facilities and considerably less expensive for them to install. 
It is the public, through their representatives in the legisla-
ture that sought and demanded cleaner air and less visual ob-
structions. 
It is appropriate here to observe that utilities are governed 
specifically under this Act by the Uniform System of Accounts. 
(State Statutes §54-8-24; Ordinance §39-7-26) This is the 
same system of accounting required by the Public Service Com-
mission, the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Federal Power Commission for the utilities. Interestingly, this 
formula, set forth in the Code sections above, require the util-
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ities to take "the original cost less depreciation taken f h 
· . . o t e 
ex1stmg overhead electric and communication facility to be . 
moved." It is clear with inflation as it is on the cost of the::. 
placement system utilities would be much better off · · 
. . . receiving 
fair market value for the ex1st10g system rather than the origi· 
nal cost less depreciation. Under the present conditions of ' 
inflation they could stand to lose considerably more than they 
would gain. 
Certainly, if the public utility were a neighbor as part of ! 
a special improvement district, they, of course, would be obli-
gated to pay their share of the cost. 
POINT V 
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE 
PERMIT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITH 
JUST COMPENSATION. 
There is a basic inconsistency m the Appellant's argu· 
ment herein. State Statute §54-8-24; Ordinance §39-7-26 both 
provide that sufficient monies will have to be obtained from 
the levy and assessment to cover any additional easements that 
need to be acquired. Presumably, the monies in question are 
to purchase or acquire easements from the property owners. 
It is true that they are making an assessment against all the 
property owners for the purpose of acquiring those easements, 
if any there be that need to be purchased, but there is no ques· 
tion that those easements that need to be acquired will be paid 
for in full with adequate compensation. As a practical matrer, 
it is anticipated as in the present improvement district, that 
most if not all of the property owners will be happy to conve) 
an easement to the utility company to assist in getting the 
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project underway. Flowers can be planted over an underground 
utility easement as easily as they can be planted under an over-
head wire and likely the flowers will prosper more. 
Assuming there is no adequate easement, the Section 
simply allows for the assessment of sufficient funds to pay for 
easements. 
State Statute §54-8-26; Ordinance §39-7-28 allows those 
who wish to make the connections with the utilities to do it 
themselves. The right to object in writing allows the property 
owner to object and to make the connections himself and the 
failure to object allows the utility company to enter his prem-
ises to connect the telephone and electrical power lines. It 
must be borne in mind that the caution with which the service 
lines are placed in the ground are as important to those living 
there as to the utilities themselves. The same expertise that 
requires the Utilities to bury the utilities or to supervise m 
burying the utilities holds true for the service line. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Statute and Ordinance should be held consti-
tutional for the reasons set forth. The Legislature has been 
extremely careful in this law to provide for more than enough 
safeguards to protect the public generally and specifically those 
in the improvement districts. There is a significant public 
benefit derived from this law. Inasmuch as new construction, 
particularly in residential and downtown areas, is going in 
without overhead utilities. This is a significant step forward in 
cleaning up visual obstructions left by generations past. 
Only those in the improvement district are taxed and the credit 
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of the community is not pledged for this debt. The only roll 
the utility companies play is that of using their expertise in 
designing the system and seeing that it is properly constructed. 
They make no profit nor receive any gain. All that is accom. 
plished is an overhead utility system being replaced by an 
underground utility system. 
The decision below should be sustained, with instructions 
to enter judgment declaring the State Statute and Ordinance 
constitutional and for a denial of the injunction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN PRESTON CREER 
Piercey, Bradford & Marsden 
1700 University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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